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479 
Title VII’s Deficiencies Affect #MeToo: A Look at Three 
Ways Title VII Continues to Fail America’s Workforce 
Imagine yourself, your daughter, your son, or your parent as the 
employee in any one of the following situations: (1) An employee 
announces that she is transitioning from a male to a female and will present 
herself as a female at work, starting immediately. The next day, this 
employee is fired. (2) As part of the curriculum requirements to graduate 
with a degree in social work, a young employee is spending a semester 
working as an unpaid intern. The supervisor makes sexualized comments 
about the employee’s body, leaving the employee uncomfortable and 
unsure where to turn. (3) A new employee arrives on the first day and 
receives dozens of documents to read and sign. The employment contract 
contains a mandatory arbitration provision subsuming any issues that arise 
during the employee’s time with the company. Signing this document may 
obliterate the employee’s ability to file a Title VII claim against the 
employer if sexual harassment or other discriminatory behavior occurs.  
These scenarios are all too real to employees across the United States, as 
evidenced by the increased number of sexual harassment claims in 2018.1 
Notably, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) filings 
of sexual harassment lawsuits increased by fifty percent, and the overall 
number of charges involving sexual harassment increased by twelve 
percent.2 These numbers should not be surprising, however, as one 
woman’s plight with bringing a sexual assault claim against a Supreme 
Court Justice nominee recently played out on national television.3 The fact 
that women in Hollywood have come forward with sexual harassment 
claims against prominent actors and directors seems to have made the 
average employee feel more comfortable airing his or her grievances.4 
Although it appears that women are more often considered victims of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, the EEOC noted that men filed nearly 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Preliminary 
FY 2018 Sexual Harassment Data (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/ 
release/10-4-18.cfm. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Haley Sweetland Edwards, How Christine Blasey Ford’s Testimony Changed 
America, TIME (Oct. 4, 2018), http://time.com/5415027/christine-blasey-ford-testimony/ 
(discussing Dr. Ford’s testimony in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding her 
allegations of sexual assault against now Justice Brett Kavanaugh).  
 4. See infra notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
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seventeen percent of sexual harassment charges in the 2017 fiscal year.5 
Moreover, a look at data from years 2010 through 2017 reveals that the 
percentage of men reporting sexual harassment charges remains fairly 
consistent.6 
The media has credited the #MeToo movement with making sexual 
harassment issues in the workplace an issue of national debate.7 Over the 
past several years, celebrities such as Harvey Weinstein,8 Bill Cosby,9 and 
Kevin Spacey have been named in sexual harassment scandals.10  
Though these scandals did not create the #MeToo Movement, they 
propelled its notoriety to national attention. Tarana Burke, a civil rights 
activist, actually crafted the phrase “me too” back in 2006 to help 
“empower[] [women] through empathy.”11 The phrase’s notoriety spread 
when actress Alyssa Milano tweeted, “If you’ve been sexually harassed or 
assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.”12 With more than 22,000 
retweets to date, the movement marched into the national spotlight, calling 
for women to stand together and fight back against sexual harassment.13 
The #MeToo movement demands that individuals have an outlet to 
report and find justice for sexual harassment and other discriminatory 
behavior, and Title VII should be one of the mechanisms to which 
employees who experience sexual assault can turn. Unfortunately, Title VII 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with the EEOC) FY 2010 – 
FY 2018, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly 
Half of Their Replacements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html. 
 8. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment 
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/ 
harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html. 
 9. Dennis Romero & Associated Press, Bill Cosby to be Sentenced for Sexual Assault 
in Andrea Constand Case, NBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018, 6:31 AM CDT), https://www. 
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/bill-cosby-be-sentenced-sexual-assault-andrea-constand-case-
n912106. 
 10. Chloe Melas, ‘House of Cards’ Employees Allege Sexual Harassment, Assault by 
Kevin Spacey, CNN MONEY (Nov. 3, 2017, 10:34 AM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2017/ 
11/02/media/house-of-cards-kevin-spacey-harassment/index.html. 
 11. Abby Ohlheiser, Meet the Woman Who Coined ‘Me Too’ 10 Years Ago — to Help 
Women of Color, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 19, 2017, 11:55 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
lifestyles/ct-me-too-campaign-origins-20171019-story.html. 
 12. Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en. 
 13. Id.  
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fails to protect certain classes of employees, while affording employers 
creative methods for avoiding Title VII actions. This Comment will limit its 
analysis to Title VII’s failure to protect employees from sex-based 
discrimination.  
Though these issues pervade every category of society, this Comment 
limits its analysis to three categories. Part II evaluates the nuances of sex-
based discrimination protections for transgender employees under Title VII. 
Part III discusses how Title VII provides little to no recourse for sex-based 
discrimination against unpaid interns. Part IV analyzes a popular method 
for stripping employees of Title VII protections: arbitration provisions. 
Each section addresses potential solutions in turn. 
I. A Brief Review of Title VII’s History 
Evaluating the history of Title VII and the meaning of “on the basis of 
sex” will help define the issues that surround sex-based discrimination. 
Title VII first became law as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 
Congress agreed to consider the Act in an attempt to rectify employment 
discrimination against African-Americans.15 As enacted, however, Title VII 
protected discrimination “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”16 Despite judicial acknowledgement of women’s 
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” based on paternalistic 
sentiments,17 including sex as a protected class in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 initially served only as a cunning attempt to kill the entire bill—not as 
a true endeavor to guarantee women workplace protections.18 Since the 
venture failed and the Act passed, women had unprecedented statutory 
protections in the workplace.  
Courts struggled with issues involving sex-based discrimination due to 
the uncertainty surrounding Congress’s rushed decision to include the 
provision.19 The legislative intent surrounding the prohibition of sex 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 15. Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 481 
(1995) (“The Act was passed in response to the mounting popular demand to extend 
constitutional equality protections to African-Americans.”). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 17. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
 18. See Sangree, supra note 15, at 481–82. 
 19. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (“[W]e are left 
with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against 
discrimination based on ‘sex.’”). 
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discrimination was unclear partly because it found its home in Title VII by 
accident.20 The EEOC executive director at the time even referred to sex-
based protections as a “fluke.”21 One scholar noted that Title VII’s failure to 
prevent and protect against sex discrimination is unsurprising because the 
legislation “has often been rather narrowly construed, to the point that some 
critics have argued that Title VII is currently incapable of providing much-
needed gender equality.”22 
That said, courts should engage a dynamic approach to interpreting Title 
VII, as these terms and their meanings have changed over time.23 Because 
the current labor market has advanced significantly since Title VII’s 
adoption, the Act’s protections should mirror these transformations.24 
Altering the language to match modern concerns of the labor market is not 
unprecedented, as it was not until 1980 that the EEOC categorized sexual 
harassment as a form of sex discrimination.25 It took another six years 
before the Supreme Court agreed with this finding.26 Despite the time it 
took for the Supreme Court to incorporate sexual harassment into the Act’s 
protections, it is clear that the Court has used its power to address labor 
market issues regardless of the unhelpful definitional framework.27  
                                                                                                                 
 20. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2012) (“Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination has no 
legislative history.”). 
 21. Rachel Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think 
Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 416 
(2009) (quoting 61 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 253–55 (Apr. 26, 1966)). 
 22. Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex 
Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55, 58 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
 23. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (rejecting the static approach to statutory interpretation and 
explaining why a more dynamic approach is beneficial); see also David A. Forkner & Kent 
M. Kostka, Unanimously Weaving a Tangled Web: Walters, Robinson, Title VII, and the 
Need for Holistic Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 161 (1999) (pointing out 
the changes in the labor market since Title VII’s enactment and arguing for a more holistic 
approach to interpreting the Act). 
 24. See Forkner & Kostka, supra note 23.  
 25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980) (“Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of 
section 703 of [T]itle VII.”). This regulation was noticed in the Federal Register on 
November 10, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (1980). 
 26. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (“Since the 
Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may 
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a 
hostile or abusive work environment.”). 
 27. See id.  
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Shortly after the Supreme Court expressly found sexual harassment to be 
a form of sex-based discrimination, Congress enacted additional damages 
provisions, thus allowing injured employees to seek greater compensation 
and provide broader access to jury trials.28 In effect, the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 tied an employer’s intentional discrimination to the company’s bottom 
line.  
Given the Act’s broad language, it should protect employees from all 
types of sex-based discrimination,29 but the Act arguably leaves some 
classes of people with little to no protection from sexual harassment and 
other forms of discrimination. Transgender employees are finding success 
in fighting discrimination in the circuit courts,30 but their long-term 
protections are uncertain until the Supreme Court clearly interprets the Act, 
or Congress amends the Act to explicitly protect these employees.31 While 
some classes of people face uncertainty, courts have undoubtedly 
interpreted the Act to exclude unpaid interns from its protection, leaving 
young adults at the mercy of the employers to act appropriately.32  
To complicate these gaps in protection, in modern day society, 
discrimination has “become[] more subtle, more entrenched, and more 
systemic in nature,”33 and employers often bypass Title VII protections by 
forcing employees to enter into mandatory arbitration provisions.34 The 
Supreme Court or Congress must address these lapses in protection head-
on, as employees should never have to wonder whether the law protects 
them from discriminatory or harassing employment practices. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 28. Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Mean and What Is 
Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 307, 312 (1992) (noting that injured employees 
suing in violation of Title VII now have access to compensatory and punitive damages in 
cases of intentional discrimination, as well as a right to ask for a jury trial).  
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 30. See infra Part II. Section II.A will discuss the success of plaintiffs who pursue 
gender non-conformity claims, while Section II.B will elaborate on the struggle for sexual 
orientation discrimination claims to survive dismissal.  
 31. The Supreme Court has accepted three writs of certiorari for cases specifically 
examining sexual orientation and transgender claims under Title VII. See Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court to Decide Whether Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay and 
Transgender Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/ 
us/politics/supreme-court-gay-transgender-employees.html. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed 
Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 940. 
 34. See infra Part IV.  
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II. The Transgender Legal Predicament: Which Claim to Bring 
With over 700,000 individuals in the United States identifying as 
transgender,35 employers must understand what actions they may legally 
take upon discovering an employee’s transgender status. The EEOC 
explicitly holds sex discrimination to include “[d]iscrimination against an 
individual because of gender identity, including transgender status, or 
because of sexual orientation.”36 Despite the EEOC’s inclusion of 
transgender identity issues in its definition of sex discrimination, many 
circuits rely solely on gender non-conformity claims to provide these 
individuals protection, rather than letting transgender identity serve as its 
own basis for sex-discrimination.37 Whether a sexual orientation claim 
receives Title VII protections, however, remains part of an ongoing circuit 
split.38 Therefore, a growing concern in litigation is under what legal 
theories a transgender employee might find protections from workplace 
harassment or discrimination.  
Before evaluating the differences between gender non-conformity and 
sexual orientation claims, it is important to understand why transgender 
individuals so desperately seek protection under Title VII. The identifier 
“transgender employee” most commonly “refers to people whose gender 
identity . . . differs from the sex they were identified with at birth.”39 Many 
transgender individuals will encounter a diagnosis of gender dysphoria at 
some point in their life.40 The American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) 
definition of gender dysphoria comports with the standard understanding of 
transgender.41 The APA, however, notes that “[g]ender dysphoria is not the 
                                                                                                                 
 35. ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS 
TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (June 2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf. 
 36. Sex-Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
 37. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th 
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599. 
 38. See infra Section II.B. 
 39. Sandra B. Reiss, Transitioning to the Transgender Workplace: What Lawyers and 
Their Clients Need to Know, 77 ALA. LAW. 429, 429 (2016). 
 40. See Walter Bockting, How Far Has Transgender Health Come Since Stonewall?, 
109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 852, 853 (2019) (“Transgender is an identity, not a disorder, yet 
many—but not all—transgender people experience gender dysphoria at some point in their 
lives.”). 
 41. What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/ 
patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria (last visited Jan. 15, 2019) 
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same as gender nonconformity [sic]” or “being gay/lesbian.”42 Though 
some may intuitively see this type of diagnosis as providing transgender 
employees with adequate access to a claim under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), the ADA explicitly excludes protections for 
“transvestism, transsexualism, . . . [or] gender identity disorders not 
resulting from physical impairments.”43  
As such, a transgender plaintiff must prove that the gender dysphoria is 
connected to a physical impairment.44 Because a transgender individual 
must show that the physical impairment led to the gender dysphoria, the 
ADA has created a high burden.45 Though transgender employees could 
bring claims for accommodations under the ADA based on gender 
dysphoria,46 the potential success of these claims exceed the scope of this 
Comment. Rather, due to this lack of protection under the ADA, 
transgender employees’ inability to find protections under other federal 
laws exemplifies the importance of Title VII protections. 
A. Discrimination Based on Gender Non-Conformity: The Successful 
Approach 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins opened 
the door to expanded Title VII protections through gender non-conformity 
claims.47 Price Waterhouse did not involve a transgender employee; rather, 
                                                                                                                 
(“Gender dysphoria involves a conflict between a person’s physical or assigned gender and 
the gender with which he/she/they identify.”). 
 42. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012).  
 44. See, e.g., Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, at *6 
(D. Mass. June 14, 2018) (“The ADA’s exclusion applies only to ‘gender identity disorders 
not resulting from physical impairments,’ and Doe has raised a dispute of fact that her 
[gender dysphoria] may result from physical causes.”) (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12211(b)(1)); Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017) (finding that the ADA does protect gender dysphoria when it arises 
as a result of a physical disability). 
 45. See Parker v. Strawser Constr., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 744, 755 (S.D. Ohio 2018) 
(“Nowhere in the Amended Complaint did Parker allege that her gender dysphoria was 
caused by a physical impairment or that gender dysphoria always results from a physical 
impairment. Moreover, the Court is not convinced that a mere difference in brain structure or 
physiology, by itself, is necessarily a ‘physical impairment’—it may have physical 
underpinnings in the brain, but not every physical difference between two groups implies 
that one of the groups is impaired in some way.”).  
 46. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  
 47. 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (“Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender into 
account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute.”). 
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partners in an accounting firm felt that a female employee did not act 
enough like a lady and denied her promotion to partner.48 The Supreme 
Court allowed this employee to maintain a Title VII claim under the theory 
of sex stereotyping.49 Notably, the Court held that an “employer who acts 
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must 
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”50 With this precedent, Title VII’s 
measures protect both men and women from sexual harassment through 
gender non-conformity claims.51 Thus, the theory that many LGBTQ 
employees rely on in Title VII claims is the idea that “sex stereotyping” is a 
form of sex discrimination that Title VII prohibits.52 Courts have relied on 
the logic espoused in Price Waterhouse and have explicitly interpreted sex 
discrimination to include sex-stereotyping against transitioning 
employees.53  
The Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
followed Price Waterhouse’s logic in its protection of a transgender 
employee.54 The EEOC filed a claim on behalf of a transitioning male-to-
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. at 234–36. 
 49. Id. at 250. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (establishing 
that individuals could engage in sexual harassment against other members of the same-sex); 
see also Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2001) (using 
gender stereotypes in same-sex harassment claims); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 
256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (using the Price Waterhouse analysis in a case where a 
man argued that “he was harassed because he failed to conform to a male stereotype”); 
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (“In other 
words, just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her 
because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim 
on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped 
expectations of masculinity.”) (citation omitted). 
 52. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259 (establishing that gender stereotyping—i.e., 
gender based discrimination—qualified as discrimination prohibited by Title VII); see also 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (establishing that 
individuals could engage in sexual harassment against other members of the same-sex).  
 53. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, 
discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex 
discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”). These courts 
oftentimes justify this reasoning based on the Supreme Court’s rationale in Price 
Waterhouse. Id. (“These instances of discrimination against plaintiffs because they fail to act 
according to socially prescribed gender roles constitute discrimination under Title VII 
according to the rationale of Price Waterhouse.”). 
 54. 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599. 
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female employee who was fired from a funeral home.55 The employee, 
Aimee Stephens, informed the business’s owner that she would begin 
transitioning “and would represent herself and dress as a woman while at 
work.”56 Shortly after providing her boss with this information, the funeral 
home terminated Stephens.57 As a result, the EEOC filed charges, claiming 
that the firing was unlawful because the termination occurred “on the basis 
of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-
based stereotypes.”58 The Sixth Circuit analyzed whether this firing related 
to discrimination based on sex stereotypes.59 Since the discrimination in 
question arose “because Stephens was ‘no longer going to represent himself 
as a man’ and ‘wanted to dress as a woman’ [the discrimination fell] 
squarely within the ambit of sex-based discrimination.”60 The court 
concluded that “discrimination on the basis of transgender status 
necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex.”61 
The funeral home filed a writ of certiorari on July 24, 2018.62 Thirteen 
state attorneys general filed an amicus brief in response, arguing that the 
Sixth Circuit improperly expanded Title VII’s definition of sex.63 The 
Supreme Court could positively dispose of this issue after hearing 
arguments in October 2019.64 This decision could clarify an entire category 
of employees’ rights under Title VII and remove the uncertainty created in 
the circuit courts.  
Another court espoused a similar rationale years before the Harris 
Funeral Homes decision. In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit provided analogous 
reasoning for protecting transgender individuals in Glenn v. Brumby.65 The 
employee, in this case, was born male,66 diagnosed with Gender Identity 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 566. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 566–67. 
 59. Id. at 571. 
 60. Id. at 572 (citations omitted) (quoting deposition testimony).  
 61. Id. at 578. 
 62. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 
No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018), 2018 WL 3572625. 
 63. See Brief for the States of Nebraska et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
2, Harris Funeral Homes, No. 18-107, 2018 WL 4105814. 
 64. October Term 2019, SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
terms/ot2019/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).  
 65. 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 66. Id. at 1314.  
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Disorder,67 and began the transition to a female.68 Around the time that the 
employee began transitioning, but before presenting as a woman, the 
employer hired her as an editor.69 About a year later, the employee told her 
employer that she was transgender and dressed as a woman at a Halloween 
event.70 Her employer expressed extreme distaste for the costume, 
ultimately asking her to leave the party.71 Despite the company’s clear 
disdain for the employee’s situation, the employee pursued her transition.72 
Thus, the employee informed her supervisor of her plans to present as a 
woman at work.73 Upon learning of the employee’s plans, the company 
fired her because it felt that the “intended gender transition was 
inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that some people would view it as 
a moral issue, and that it would make [her] coworkers uncomfortable.”74 
Among other causes of action, the employee sued for sex discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.75  
Although the plaintiff raised a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
based on gender non-conformity, the court analogized that if Title VII bars 
such discrimination, then discrimination based on gender non-conformity 
violated the Equal Protection Clause as well.76 In reviewing the claim, the 
Eleventh Circuit evaluated gender non-conformity issues under Title VII.77 
Most specifically, the court noted that “[a] person is defined as transgender 
precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses 
gender stereotypes.”78 After recognizing that “[a]ll persons, whether 
transgender or not, are protected from discrimination on the basis of gender 
stereotype,”79 the court concluded that sex-based discrimination under the 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. Gender identity disorder was the medical community’s previous diagnosis for 
gender dysphoria. See generally Arlene Istar Lev, Gender Dysphoria: Two Steps Forward, 
One Step Back, 41 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 288 (2013).  
 68. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. (quoting the employer). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 1316–18. 
 77. Id. at 1316. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1318. 
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Equal Protection Clause necessarily encompassed discrimination in cases of 
gender non-conformity.80 
In stark contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s explicit use of Title VII as a 
safeguard for transgender workers, other circuits have expressly denied that 
Title VII includes transgender protections.81 Even the past two presidential 
administrations have been at odds over whether Title VII may extend to 
protect transgender employees from gender-based discrimination.82 
Although gender non-conformity claims have been successful, without 
express protection from the Supreme Court or Congress, the protections 
could evaporate at any moment.  
B. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation: An Uncertain Outcome 
Sexual orientation discrimination claims do not enjoy the steady 
protection under Title VII that gender non-conformity claims do. One 
recent decision noted that “because sexual orientation is a function of sex 
and sex is a protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual 
orientation is also protected.”83 The Second Circuit’s decision in Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc. brought two government agencies at odds, as the 
EEOC filed an amicus brief in support of finding that sexual orientation 
was protected84 and the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in 
support of the opposite.85 Ultimately, the Zarda court held that it was a 
natural conclusion to find that “sex is necessarily a factor in sexual 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 1320. 
 81. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e 
conclude discrimination against a transsexual because she is a transsexual is not 
‘discrimination because of sex.’”); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[I]f the term ‘sex’ as it is used in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or 
biological female, the new definition must come from Congress.”); Sommers v. Budget 
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to include transsexuals within the 
definitional framework of Title VII). 
 82. Robert Iafolla, Supreme Court Can Settle Split on LGBT Bias in the Workplace, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2019, 8:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/supreme-court-can-settle-split-on-lgbt-bias-in-the-workplace. 
 83. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 
S. Ct. 1599 (“Because one cannot fully define a person’s sexual orientation without 
identifying his or her sex, sexual orientation is a function of sex.”). 
 84. En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 
Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of Reversal, Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (No. 15-
3775), 2017 WL 2730281. 
 85. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (No. 15-3775), 
2017 WL 3277292. 
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orientation.”86 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has noted that 
“workplace discrimination because of [the employee’s] sexual orientation” 
does not amount to a claim under Title VII.87 The courts finding that sexual 
orientation discrimination falls outside the scope of Title VII typically 
distinguish these claims from gender non-conformity and same-sex 
harassment claims.88 Congress has also repeatedly refused to adopt 
measures that would include protections for sexual orientation 
discrimination.89  
The Seventh Circuit was the initial circuit to depart from precedent and 
protect employees facing sexual orientation discrimination in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Community College of Indiana.90 Starting in 2000, the “openly 
lesbian” professor taught as an adjunct at the college.91 After the professor 
applied for and was rejected from several full-time openings over five 
years, the college terminated the professor’s part-time contract.92 The court 
noted that its job was not to change Title VII but to determine whether Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination banned sexual orientation 
discrimination.93 The court understood the impact of its decision and 
commented that “[t]oday’s decision must be understood against the 
backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field of 
employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.”94 Because one cannot “remove the ‘sex’ 
from ‘sexual orientation,’”95 “it is actually impossible to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.”96 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112. 
 87. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 88. Id. at 1256 (“These Supreme Court decisions do not squarely address whether 
sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII.”); see also Medina v. Income 
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII’s protections, however, do 
not extend to harassment due to a person’s sexuality . . . . ‘Congress has repeatedly rejected 
legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation.’”) (quoting Bibby, 
260 F.3d at 261); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Employment Non-discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. 
(1996); Employment Non-discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); 
Employment Non-discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994). 
 90. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 91. Id. at 341. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 343. 
 94. Id. at 349. 
 95. Id. at 350. 
 96. Id. at 351. 
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In the same year that the Seventh Circuit departed from precedent, the 
Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital that 
sexual orientation discrimination was beyond the scope of Title VII’s 
protections.97 In Evans, a hospital security officer alleged that her employer 
terminated her for presenting in a more masculine manner than would be 
normally expected of a woman.98 After the hospital ended the employment 
relationship, the security officer complained that the termination violated 
several hospital policies and procedures.99 Once presented with these 
complaints, the hospital’s senior human resources manager asked the 
officer “about her sexuality,” which led the officer and others to conclude 
that her masculinity played a role in the hospital’s employment decisions.100 
In finding that Title VII did not provide protections for sexual orientation 
claims, the court acknowledged that the majority of circuit courts reached 
the same conclusion.101 The Eleventh Circuit refused to break from the 
established precedent, which summarily held that Title VII did not protect 
against sexual orientation discrimination.102 The Evans court exemplifies 
the predicament for many similarly situated employees, as it remanded the 
gender non-conformity claim but upheld dismissal of the sexual orientation 
claim.103 
Sexual orientation’s status as a component of sex-based protections 
under Title VII is important to transgender employees because many 
transgender employees also face discrimination for their sexual 
orientation.104 The continued conflict between circuits as to whether Title 
VII provides protections based on sexual orientation discrimination makes 
it more likely that a transgender employee will succeed with a charge for 
discrimination on the basis of gender non-conformity because there is 
Supreme Court rationale to support such a claim.105 Since only two circuits 
have expressly found that sexual orientation discrimination offends Title 
                                                                                                                 
 97. 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1256. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 1255, 1257. 
 104. See generally Crosby Burns & Jeff Krehely, Gay and Transgender People Face 
High Rates of Workplace Discrimination and Harassment, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2, 
2011, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9872/gay-
and-transgender-people-face-high-rates-of-workplace-discrimination-and-harassment/. 
 105. See supra Section II.A. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
492 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:479 
 
 
VII,106 transgender employees should only make these claims in the 
alternative and not rely on either of them as the sole basis for a lawsuit. 
Until the Supreme Court, or a larger coalition of circuit courts at least, finds 
that sexual orientation qualifies for sex-based discrimination protection, 
transgender employees may be more successful claiming discrimination on 
the basis of gender non-conformity. Fortunately for these plaintiffs, the 
Supreme Court has the opportunity to do exactly that when it hears two 
sexual orientation issues in October 2019.107 
C. The Need for Congressional Clarity 
The lack of legislative intent behind Title VII’s sex-based discrimination 
provision continues to limit federal courts’ ability to interpret and apply the 
provision properly.108 The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to 
address this problem when it hears three Title VII cases in October 2019,109 
but some justices may find this issue to be best left to congressional 
resolution.110 
The definitional framework in Title VII is unclear, and there is no 
congressional history for courts to use when determining whether 
protections are afforded to certain types of sex-based discrimination.111 
Creating a clear precedent is not only important for employees whom this 
ambiguity affects but also for employers who need to know how to legally 
conduct their business given the growing expense of litigation. 
Consequently, a legislative measure would most aptly address the 
ambiguity surrounding the original intent of sex-based discrimination. 
Amending or clarifying the language congressionally could definitively 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
 107. October Term 2019, SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
terms/ot2019/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). The Court will hear the Zarda case, discussed 
above, and Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners. Id. Zarda came down in 
favor of sexual orientation protections under Title VII. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116. Bostock, on 
the other hand, simply affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s position that sexual orientation claims 
were beyond the scope of Title VII without further discussion. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. 
of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 964 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599. 
 108. See supra Part I. 
 109. See supra notes 64 and 107 and accompanying text. 
 110. Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Clashes Over Meaning of ‘Sex’ in LGBT 
Discrimination Case, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2019, 12:17 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/ 
10/08/supreme-court-clashes-over-meaning-of-sex-in-lgbt-discrimination-cases.html. 
 111. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113–15. 
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conclude whether some some courts’ interpretations that “the plain meaning 
of ‘sex’ encompasses [nothing] more than male and female.”112  
Notwithstanding federal courts' precedent, some states already have laws 
to prevent discrimination against transgender people.113 These state laws, 
however, may not adequately protect individuals facing sexual harassment, 
as the states can impose a higher burden on the plaintiff than is found in 
Title VII.114 Although the majority of circuits apply Title VII protections to 
gender non-conformity claims, the courts may still reverse course absent a 
definitive Supreme Court decision or congressional action. Further, the 
ongoing circuit split over Title VII’s applicability to sexual orientation 
discrimination demands immediate clarification.  
III. Unpaid Interns: Applying an Archaic Definition 
to Modern Economic Practices 
Students gain meaningful and necessary job experience through unpaid 
internships, but they may be putting their safety at risk. Internships are “one 
of the most common methods that students use to gain real world 
experience and attempt to secure employment for post-graduation.”115 
Interning while still a student is “a virtual requirement in the scramble” to 
secure full-time employment.116 Even with this seemingly high demand for 
students to intern, a lack of Title VII protections for unpaid interns poses a 
major dilemma because these individuals essentially function as employees 
without pay or legal protections.117  
Internships were not always a prerequisite to full-time employment. In 
the late twentieth century, graduate-level institutions began offering 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 113. See JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE 
EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES 3–4 (June 2012), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrim 
ination.pdf (providing a chart that displays which states protect gender non-conformity 
claims and sexual orientation claims).  
 114. See, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 110 (“The panel held that ‘Zarda's [federal] sex-
discrimination claim [was] properly before [it] because [his state law claim was tried under] 
a higher standard of causation than required by Title VII.’”) (quoting the panel opinion, 855 
F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2017)) (alterations in original). 
 115. Sean Hughes & Jerry Lagomarsine, The Misfortune of the Unpaid Intern, 32 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 409, 409 (2015). 
 116. David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 215, 215 (2002). 
 117. See Hughes & Lagomarsine, supra note 115, at 421. 
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students class credit for participating in internships.118 This shift created “a 
sharp expansion in standard, formal internships at many firms in various 
industries.”119 Additionally, the 2008 recession increased demand for 
internships because employers could not afford to hire inexperienced 
workers, and students needed experience to obtain jobs.120 Since these 
programs have continued to play a vital role in the modern economy, it is 
appalling to discover that these interns have no legal protections or recourse 
under Title VII.121 
To access Title VII coverage, an individual must qualify as an employee 
of the company he or she seeks to charge with discrimination.122 Title VII 
defines an employee as an “individual employed by an employer.”123 
Unfortunately, Title VII is not the only piece of federal legislation that 
defines an employee so ambiguously.124 This circular definition provides 
little help in understanding whether the drafters intended the law’s 
protections to wholly exclude unpaid interns. To be certain, if interns 
receive monetary payment for their time and services, then they most likely 
fit within Title VII’s definition of employee. This Comment focuses on 
individuals who intern without pay and thus fall outside the protection of 
Title VII.  
A. Qualifying as an Employee Under Title VII 
Courts apply various tests to determine whether an individual qualifies as 
an employee under Title VII’s ambiguous definition.125 The five most 
notable tests are as follows: (1) the benefits analysis test, (2) the common 
law agency test, (3) the primary purpose test, (4) the economic realities test, 
and (5) the hybrid test.126 These tests typically consider some kind of 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Elizabeth Heffernan, Comment, “It Will Be Good for You,” They Said: Ensuring 
Internships Actually Benefit the Intern and Why It Matters for FLSA and Title VII Claims, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 1757, 1762 (2017). 
 119. Id.  
 120. See id.  
 121. See, e.g., Wang v. Phx. Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 122. See, e.g., Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 351–52 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating 
that plaintiffs must have been employees to maintain a Title VII claim). 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012). 
 124. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (Fair Labor Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(6) (2012) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) 
(Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 125. Heffernan, supra note 118, at 1768. 
 126. Id. 
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compensation as a primary factor in determining whether the individual 
qualifies as an employee.127 
Some courts even require that a plaintiff prove remuneration as an 
“essential condition” before applying their respective test of choice.128 
Basically, as a preliminary step, these courts require a showing that the 
plaintiff received something of benefit, including a salary or employee 
benefit like health insurance, vacation time, or sick pay.129 The Sixth 
Circuit, however, considers remuneration as part of the analysis itself rather 
than an independent, preliminary step.130 
1. Benefits Analysis Test 
Typically, courts use the benefits analysis test in one of two ways: (1) as 
a threshold test before considering an alternate test or (2) as a stand-alone 
analysis to determine whether an individual qualifies as an employee.131 
The stand-alone examination often focuses on the “essential condition” of 
whether an individual received monetary compensation, as the monetary 
compensation creates a plausible employment relationship.132 Courts, 
however, can still find that other “numerous job-related benefits” could 
satisfy the test in the absence of direct compensation.133 
When used as a threshold test, “the key question is whether, and to what 
extent, the worker receives remuneration.”134 The plaintiff must first show 
that the employer hired her in exchange for some sort of remuneration 
before the court analyzes the facts under a separate test.135 To show 
remuneration, the employee need not necessarily show that she was paid 
wages, although wages provide the simplest approach. Even without 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id.  
 128. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 131. Lauren Fredericksen, Comment, Falling Through the Cracks of Title VII: The Plight 
of the Unpaid Intern, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 245, 256 (2013). 
 132. Id. (citing O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116; Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 
F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990); Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 712–13 (S.D. Ohio 
1996); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). 
 133. Id. (quoting Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 
468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 221–
22 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. Typically the two tests used in conjunction with the benefits analysis test as a 
threshold analysis are the common law agency test and the economic realities test. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
496 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:479 
 
 
traditional benefits or direct compensation, “some courts have found a jury 
question as to the issue of remuneration and benefits.”136  
Indirect remuneration through a service-for-benefits exchange may be 
satisfactory.137 “[A]n employment relationship can exist without a salary so 
long as the putative employee receives numerous job-related benefits.”138 
However, these “other benefits” that courts have considered as satisfying 
the remuneration requirement have not typically extended to benefits that 
an unpaid intern might receive from the program. Namely, “a clear pathway 
to employment . . . might constitute sufficient compensation,”139 but courts 
have rejected quintessential internship benefits, such as on-the-job training 
and future career opportunities as being too speculative.140 In summary, no 
consistent holding determines what type of indirect benefit amounts to 
remuneration and thus qualifies the unpaid intern as an employee.  
The most notable case applying the benefit analysis test as a threshold 
test to unpaid student interns is O’Connor v. Davis.141 In that case, a student 
enrolled in a local college’s social work program and had to “perform 200 
hours of field work” to graduate.142 She began an internship where she 
“attended morning staff meetings . . . [and] met with the patients assigned 
to her both one-on-one and in groups.”143 During the internship period, one 
of the licensed psychiatrists referred to the female intern as “Miss Sexual 
Harassment.”144 Even after the intern complained to her supervisor, the 
psychiatrist continued to refer to her with a “repertoire of inappropriate 
sexual remarks.”145 Despite the fact that the student-intern reported the 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 137. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221–22 (holding that benefits such as a pension, group life 
insurance, reimbursement for courses, and worker’s compensation coverage should be 
considered enough to overcome the threshold analysis). 
 138. Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 257 (citing Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473).  
 139. Rafi v. Thompson, No. 02-2356(JR), 2006 WL 3091483, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 
2006). 
 140. Marie, 771 F.3d at 355 (“[A]rguments about enhanced career opportunities, access 
to training, or possible future employment have been rejected by courts when these 
opportunities are accessible to the public generally or when they are too speculative.”) 
(citing Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990); Moran v. 
Harris Cty., No. H-07-582, 2007 WL 2534824, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2007); Holder v. 
Town of Bristol, No. 3:09-CV-32PPS, 2009 WL 3004552, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009)).  
 141. 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 142. Id. at 113. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/8
2020]       COMMENTS 497 
 
 
behavior on multiple occasions, the behavior and commentary became so 
pervasive that she no longer felt comfortable working at the facility.146 
After the escalating harassment forced her to quit, the student brought 
suit.147 As a prerequisite to evaluating the student’s employee status under 
the ideals of “the conventional master-servant relationship,” the court had 
to determine whether the student received Title VII’s protections.148 So, the 
court applied the benefits analysis test.149 The court explicitly held: 
Where no financial benefit is obtained by the purported 
employee from the employer, no “plausible” employment 
relationship of any sort can be said to exist because although 
“compensation by the putative employer to the putative 
employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient 
condition . . . it is an essential condition to the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship.”150 
The court decided that the student was not afforded any Title VII 
protections because the student received no “direct or indirect economic 
remuneration or the promise thereof.”151 The absence of a “salary, health 
benefits, retirement benefits, and [lack of] regular hours” lent itself to 
finding the plaintiff to be solely an unpaid intern who did not qualify as an 
employee.152 Since the plaintiff failed the benefits analysis as a preliminary 
step, the court concluded its analysis.153 
2. Common Law Agency Test 
The common law agency test requires that “Title VII . . . be construed in 
light of general common law concepts.”154 Courts decided that the common 
law agency test, taken from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, applies as 
a result of congressional failure to indicate which test it intended courts to 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. at 114. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 115 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 
(1992)).  
 149. See id. at 115–16. 
 150. Id. (quoting Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 
1990)). 
 151. Id. at 116. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982).  
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apply directly.155 The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides many 
factors for courts to consider when determining the existence of agency 
relationships,156 and the Supreme Court recognized that “all of the incidents 
of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being 
decisive.”157 In spite of this guidance, courts have focused on the degree of 
an employer’s ability to control the individual’s work in the Title VII 
context.158 Though the common law agency test initially sought to decide 
whether an individual qualifies as an employee or independent contractor, 
the logic has been extended to determining whether an individual qualifies 
as a volunteer or an employee.159 Arguably, it extends even further to 
analyze whether an intern qualifies as an employee.160 
In Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit determined that “it is 
the economic realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common 
law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the 
employee that are determinative.”161 The Eleventh Circuit had to determine 
whether the lower court properly classified a custodian as an independent 
contractor, which would disqualify him from Title VII protections.162 
Because the lower court properly applied the common law agency test and 
found that the employer did not supervise the janitorial work, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the custodian’s non-employee status.163  
In a similar scenario, the Sixth Circuit considered whether volunteer 
nuns could be considered employees under Title VII in Marie v. American 
Red Cross.164 Although it seems possible for volunteers to attain employee 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 79–80 (1984).  
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 157. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting NLRB v. 
United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)). 
 158. See Dowd, supra note 155, at 81–83. 
 159. See Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 351–53 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 160. See, e.g., Keiko Rose, Volunteer Protection under Title VII: Is Remuneration 
Required?, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 605 (2014) (discussing the interplay between volunteer 
status and Title VII’s requirements). 
 161. 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 162. See id. at 341–42. 
 163. Id. at 342. 
 164. Marie, 771 F.3d at 351. Because the court in this instance considered the benefits 
analysis almost in conjunction with the common law agency principles, the Sixth Circuit 
may have applied more of a hybrid test; however, the analysis of the types of remuneration 
considered helps to flesh out what might overcome the benefits analysis either as a stand-
alone test or as a threshold test. 
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status under Title VII,165 the Sixth Circuit found that plaintiffs in this case 
had not.166 The Sixth Circuit clarified that it considered the benefits analysis 
as “a nondispositive factor that should be assessed in conjunction with the 
other . . . factors to determine if a volunteer is an employee” and not a 
threshold analysis.167 Specifically, in analyzing the non-tangible benefits 
available to the nuns, the court held that the “liability insurance for injuries 
sustained during service, in-kind donations, and reimbursements for 
travel . . . are contingent or were simply incidental to their work.”168 
Further, “the educational opportunities, possibility of promotions, increased 
standing in the community, networking opportunities, opportunities for 
grants, and access to opportunities to serve [were] speculative and 
insufficient to constitute remuneration here.”169 Ultimately, the nuns failed 
to overcome the presumption that they simply served as volunteers for the 
Red Cross.170 
Since this rigid test “tends to exclude the greatest number of persons 
from Title VII coverage,” some scholars have come to disfavor its use.171 
The common law agency test often “focus[es] only on characteristics [of 
the employment relationship that] indicat[e] control within the putative 
employment relationship that are easily measured.”172 This narrowed focus 
fails to reveal what the relationship between the employer and the plaintiff 
truly looks like because it fails to appreciate the nearly identical functions 
present in unpaid internships and employment relationships.173 
  
                                                                                                                 
 165. See Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 
2011). The Bryson court did not independently hold the firefighters to be employees but 
noted that the lower court had improperly applied the remuneration factor as an independent 
factor, rather than one of many to consider. Id. 
 166. Marie, 771 F.3d at 359. 
 167. Id. at 353. 
 168. Id. at 355. 
 169. Id. at 356. 
 170. Id. at 359. 
 171. Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for 
the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2628 (1998); see also Dowd, supra note 155, 
at 85 (“In sum, the application of the common law test results in the arbitrary exclusion of 
independent contractors from Title VII coverage based on an analysis which is unduly 
simplistic.”); Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 258–59 (“Critics of the common law agency 
test as applied by lower courts argue that the test is limited by its emphasis on an overly 
formal structure between the employer and the putative employee, rather than considering 
the reality and context of the relationship.”). 
 172. Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 259. 
 173. Id. 
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3. Primary Purpose Test 
Some courts choose to evaluate an individual’s employment status based 
on the primary purpose of the entire relationship.174 The Tenth Circuit 
applied this logic in Williams v. Meese when deciding whether a prisoner 
qualified as an employee under Title VII.175 The court specifically noted 
that the prisoner could not be an employee under Title VII because “his 
relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and therefore, with the defendants, 
[arose] out of his status as an inmate, not an employee.”176 Because “[t]he 
primary purpose of [the defendant and plaintiff’s] association [was] 
incarceration, not employment,” the prisoner could not establish that his 
relationship with the Bureau of Prisons amounted to more than an 
accommodation for his sentence.177 Given that the primary purpose of the 
inmate’s relationship with the prison system was solely for incarceration 
and no other employment-related purpose, the prisoner did not receive 
employee status.178 
By contrast, some courts interpret the primary purpose test to focus on 
the intent of Title VII itself, which was to initially protect certain classes of 
individuals from discriminatory employment practices.179 Although not 
evaluating Title VII, an example of examining the purpose and intent of 
employment legislation is found in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, where the 
Supreme Court evaluated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).180 
Here, the court analyzed Congress’s intent behind the NLRA,181 and 
ultimately found that newspaper boys fit within the Act’s framework of 
employee.182  
Looking to the primary purpose of the relationship appears to be the 
modern approach to applying the primary purpose test, but both appear to 
be applicable in understanding whether an individual qualifies for employee 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id.  
 175. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (first alteration in original) 
(second alteration added).  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 86-7, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 2–3 (1986)). 
 178. Id.  
 179. See supra Part I; see also NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (“That 
term, like other provisions, must be understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and 
the facts involved in the economic relationship.”); Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Comment, Title 
VII Protections for Inmates: A Model Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America’s 
Prisons, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1064 (2011). 
 180. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 113. 
 181. Id. at 123–28. 
 182. Id. at 132. 
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protections. Both approaches require looking at the “underlying economic 
relationship” as a primary rather than secondary consideration, effectively 
excluding any unpaid party from achieving employee status.183 
4. Economic Realities Test 
Under the economic realities test, “one must examine the economic 
realities underlying the relationship between the individual and the so-
called principal in an effort to determine whether that individual is likely to 
be susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the act was designed to 
eliminate.”184 The Sixth Circuit transitioned from the primary purpose test 
to the economic realities test because courts broadly construe loosely 
defined terms, such as employee.185 In Armbruster v. Quinn, two former 
secretaries sued for sexual harassment under Title VII.186 The court was 
“unpersuaded that the term ‘employee’ was meant in a technical sense, 
divorced from the broad[] humanitarian goals of the Act.”187 Therefore, the 
Sixth Circuit held that it must also consider the “economic realities 
underlying the relationship,”188 ultimately directing the lower court to 
consider this factor on remand.189  
Based on the facts that the university provided the student with a stipend, 
benefits, sick leave, and annual leave,190 the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
graduate student research assistant was an employee of the university.191 
However, to the detriment of some unpaid interns, the Eleventh Circuit 
noted in this same case that courts tend to only grant graduate students 
employee-status when “their academic requirements were truly central to 
the relationship with the institution.”192 
  
                                                                                                                 
 183. Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 259–60. 
 184. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Arbaugh 
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 185. Id. (noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act which has the same circular definition 
for employee “ha[s] been given the broadest definition ever included in any one act”). 
 186. Id. at 1334. 
 187. Id. at 1341.  
 188. Id. at 1340. 
 189. Id. at 1342. 
 190. Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). The 
court also found that the facts that a collective bargaining agreement was in place, that the 
University provided the equipment and training, and that the decision not to renew the 
student’s position for employment reasons (rather than academic) all indicated that the 
student was an employee rather than solely a student. Id.  
 191. Id. at 1232, 1235. 
 192. Id. at 1235. 
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5. Hybrid Test 
The hybrid test, now employed by a majority of courts, combines 
elements from the common law agency test and the economic realities 
test.193 Essentially, courts consider the economic realities of the 
employment relationship alongside the employer’s control over the 
individual.194 The Tenth Circuit applied this test in Zinn v. McKune when it 
considered whether a Kansas Department of Corrections nurse qualified as 
an employee under Title VII.195 The court evaluated the relationship 
through the common law agency test by evaluating who had the right to 
control the nurse’s activities in conjunction with other factors, such as the 
level of supervision, requisite skill, and type of benefits involved.196 Under 
the hybrid test, courts should evaluate all of these factors by looking “to the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the working relationship between 
the parties.”197 
B. Unpaid and Unprotected 
Almost every test that a court may consider when evaluating the 
existence of an employment relationship requires determining whether one 
party paid the other. This determination almost always leaves unpaid 
interns without protections from discriminatory and harassing behaviors. 
Generally, an unpaid intern fails to prove remuneration as a threshold 
matter, thus creating a nearly insurmountable hurdle. O’Connor v. Davis, 
discussed above, illustrates the struggles that interns face when attempting 
to prove remuneration, even when completing an internship as an 
educational requirement.198  
The precedent established in O’Connor also implies that a student lacks 
protection against an employer during an externship. Though not a 
published decision, in Allen v. Cumberland Medical Center, Inc., a federal 
district court held that a student extern received no Title VII protections 
because she failed the remuneration requirement.199 Within the first few 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 261. 
 194. Id. at 262. 
 195. 143 F.3d 1353, 1354–55 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 196. Id. at 1357 (citing Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 
1996)). 
 197. Id. It is possible that other factors would be relevant under the hybrid test, but it is 
clear that the Tenth Circuit felt these three factors were of specific importance. 
 198. 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997); see also supra Section III.A.1. 
 199. Allen v. Cumberland Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 2:10–cv–0045, 2010 WL 3825667, at *4 
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2010). 
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weeks of her externship at a medical center, the plaintiff-extern reported 
that an employee had “sexually harassed [her] by making unwanted sexual 
advances and by inappropriately touching her.”200 Relying on the Second 
Circuit’s decision in O’Connor, the court held that externships did not meet 
the remuneration requirement either.201 Therefore, since the student did not 
receive any form of remuneration and “was placed in the unpaid externship 
because it was required by her school’s curriculum,” the plaintiff’s quest for 
Title VII protection was futile.202  
Because unpaid interns work without pay, their claims rarely survive 
initial determinations of employee status.203 Simply because the benefits are 
not in the form of money, an unpaid intern should not automatically be 
without Title VII’s safeguards. Not only do these individuals remain 
unpaid, but they also lack Title VII’s statutory protections against sexual 
harassment and discrimination. O’Connor clearly evinces that unpaid 
interns should worry about their lack of protection from unwanted sexual 
advances and sexualized comments. 
C. Including Unpaid Interns Under Title VII: Expanding Definitions 
Judicially or Legislatively 
Because Title VII’s “wide-sweeping goal [was] equality in 
employment,” its failure to protect unpaid student interns from 
discrimination directly undermines its purpose.204 Title VII was meant to 
protect all workers from discriminatory behavior, and interpreting the 
definition of employee narrowly fails to accomplish this goal.205 
Consequently, either courts should extend the judicially-created tests for 
determining employee status to include unpaid interns, or Congress should 
modernize the archaic and ineffective definition of employee to include 
anyone who performs services for an employer’s benefit. These changes 
would arguably broaden Title VII eligibility to include unpaid interns. 
Because unpaid interns contribute to our economy, society should protect 
them from discrimination and harassment. Even more, unpaid interns often 
engage in the same type of work as employees but do not receive 
compensation or legal protection. The law should not weaponize 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Id. at *1. 
 201. Id. at *4. 
 202. Id.  
 203. See, e.g., O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116. 
 204. Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 248–49. 
 205. See id.  
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individuals’ “intern” status to encumber their ability to seek protection from 
harassment and discrimination. 
1. Expanding Remuneration  
Given the way the courts define benefit, the remuneration requirement 
immediately disadvantages student interns.206 As discussed above, when 
courts limit their focus to monetary components of the employment 
relationship and refuse to consider other forms of remuneration, unpaid 
interns are unable to convince courts of their employment status.207 Courts, 
however, can address this problem by lowering the judicially created 
threshold for what qualifies as remuneration. As it stands, courts do not 
protect students from workplace discrimination under Title VII when they 
receive an educational or career benefit.208 This analysis must change.  
If the remuneration requirement must persist, the requirement should 
broaden to include interns who receive educational benefits while working. 
The company, in such a situation, provides a benefit to the intern through 
introducing the intern to work experience and teaching the intern necessary 
workplace skills. The intern, in turn, provides the employer with benefits as 
well, such as free labor and access to a pipeline of potential employees. 
Notably, an employer can mold these interns into ideal employees while 
gauging their compatibility with the company’s culture before hiring them. 
Employers face little risk when acquiring student workers at no cost and 
reserving the option to decide whether the student’s performance warrants a 
job offer, ultimately providing the company strong bargaining power. 
Because both interns and employers receive clear benefits from the unpaid 
internship relationship, courts should find that unpaid interns satisfy the 
remuneration requirement and should be classified as employees under 
Title VII.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 206. See Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A]rguments 
about enhanced career opportunities, access to training, or possible future employment have 
been rejected by courts when these opportunities are accessible to the public generally or 
when they are too speculative.”) (citing Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 
71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990); Moran v. Harris Cty., No. H-07-582, 2007 WL 2534824, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 31, 2007); Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09-CV-32PPS, 2009 WL 3004552, at 
*6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009)).  
 207. See generally O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116 (finding an unpaid student intern could not 
be an employee as defined in Title VII) 
 208. Id. (discussing whether an internship provides any substantive benefit to the 
student). 
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2. Modernizing the Definition of Employee 
Existing limitations on the term “employee” prevent Title VII from 
accomplishing its goals. Nothing in Title VII indicates that an unpaid 
student intern should not receive protection from age, gender, sex, religion, 
or national origin discrimination. Specifically, unpaid interns were likely 
not even a consideration at the time that the legislature crafted this 
definition, which is why a dynamic interpretation of the Act is necessary.209 
Because courts continue to focus on the Act’s broad and circular 
definition,210 there is no compelling justification for courts or Congress not 
to expand this definition to include unpaid interns. A better definition of 
employee would cover any “individual working in exchange for salary, 
wage, or other consideration.”211  
This “other consideration” component would qualify unpaid interns for 
Title VII protections, as unpaid interns would be working in exchange for 
other consideration. These individuals agree to participate in unpaid intern 
programs for required course credit, on the job experience, and/or the 
ability to grow their professional network.212 These intangible benefits 
should establish enough of an employment relationship to shelter unpaid 
interns from discriminatory business practices. In a just society, working 
without pay should not expose unpaid interns to sexual harassment in the 
workplace without legal recourse.  
To address this issue, Congress may have to expressly identify unpaid 
interns as an employee under Title VII or, at the very least, provide a 
clearer definition than what is currently in place. Because society has a 
better understanding of sexual harassment in the workplace and unpaid 
internships have grown since Title VII’s adoption, the 1964 definition of 
“employee” must not be permitted to continue to deprive today’s workers.  
                                                                                                                 
 209. See generally Forkner & Kostka, supra note 24, at 162–66 (pointing out that Title 
VII’s enacting Congress likely could not imagine the modern economy and dynamic labor 
market, so applying static definitions to the Act does more harm than good). 
 210. O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115 (“The definition of the term ‘employee’ provided in 
Title VII is circular.”); Barnes v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 978, 980 
(N.D. Tex. 1993) (“To determine employee status within that broad and circular definition, 
the Fifth Circuit has adopted a hybrid economic realities/common-law control test.”). 
 211. Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 249 (emphasis added). Fredericksen believes this 
definition to be the “dictionary definition” of the term employee, making it even more 
appropriate to apply this definition to Title VII’s definitional framework. Id. at 249 & n.24.  
 212. Penny Loretto, The Benefits of Doing an Unpaid Internship, BALANCE CAREERS, 
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/are-there-benefits-to-doing-an-unpaid-internship-
1986787 (last updated Sept. 9, 2019). 
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D. A Brief Note as to Why the Definition of Employee Should Not Change 
in All Federal Legislation 
Several federal employment laws contain a definition of employee 
similar to that found in Title VII.213 Though at least one article suggests that 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title VII should adopt a uniform 
test to analyze employee status, 214 this Comment does not go that far. 
While both labor laws use the same ambiguous definition for employee,215 
classifying every unpaid intern as an employee under the FLSA would 
negate the purpose of an unpaid intern because the company would be 
forced to compensate the intern—a result that may do more harm than 
good.216 If interns can qualify for FLSA benefits and minimum wage 
protections, companies may refuse to offer unpaid internships in the first 
place because they will become too costly. Since the purpose of an 
internship is to exchange free labor for job experience, mandatory 
minimum wage protections would violate the principles upon which many 
companies’ programs are founded.217 Therefore, though the definition of 
employee under the FLSA provides a useful comparison, this Comment 
does not argue that a finding of employee status under Title VII necessitates 
the same finding under the FLSA. 
However, an unpaid intern may seek qualification as an employee under 
the FLSA before bringing a Title VII claim. Because successfully proving 
qualification for FLSA coverage would help an intern satisfy the 
remuneration requirement, she would be more likely to qualify as an 
employee under Title VII. The Department of Labor test for determining 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (Fair Labor Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(6) (2012) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) 
(Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 214. See, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 118, at 1781–83. 
 215. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by 
an employer.”). 
 216. See Fredericksen, supra note 131, at 269 (discussing the Department of Labor’s 
guidelines for FLSA coverage and noting that a finding under of employee status under both 
FLSA and Title VII could have a “chilling effect”). 
 217. See Nicolas A. Pologeorgis, Unpaid Internship Impact on the Labor Market, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/12/impact-of-unpaid-
internships.asp#benefits-to-employers (last updated June 25, 2019) (noting that employers 
benefit from unpaid interns through reduced costs, the ability to mold potential future 
employees, and receiving fresh perspective and energy).  
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employee status may still prove difficult for an unpaid intern to satisfy, as 
there are seven relevant factors for a court to consider.218 
In Wang v. Hearst Corp., the Second Circuit applied the primary 
beneficiary test to a group of unpaid interns’ class action claim where they 
argued that they fit the definition of employee and should therefore receive 
compensation under the FLSA.219 The company in Wang hired student 
interns to work without pay, on the condition that each student was enrolled 
for class credit.220 The court applied a “flexible” totality of the 
circumstances test.221 After reviewing the seven factors necessary to 
determine the existence of an employee-employer relationship, the lower 
court held that the students all qualified as interns and granted the 
corporation summary judgment.222 The Second Circuit held that summary 
judgment was proper because a judge can properly assess those factors 
based on the undisputed facts in the record.223  
One of the main factors the court considered was the connection between 
the internship and the student’s education.224 The court highlighted that the 
internship’s timing (i.e., during the summer months), relevance to the 
student’s academic goals, and connection to the student’s specific degree 
program all weighed in favor of the interns not qualifying for FLSA.225 The 
other factors the court analyzed focused more on the way that the interns’ 
work impacted the work environment, which is helpful for unpaid interns 
who engage in meaningful work during their time with a company.226 The 
Second Circuit’s focus on the interns’ connection to a university program, 
                                                                                                                 
 218. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET 13: EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (revised July 2008), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf. The seven relevant factors include: 
(1) The extent to which the services rendered are an integral part of the principal's business; 
(2) the permanency of the relationship; (3) the amount of the alleged contractor's investment 
in facilities and equipment; (4) the nature and degree of control by the principal; (5) the 
alleged contractor's opportunities for profit and loss; (6) the amount of initiative, judgment, 
or foresight in open market competition with others required for the success of the claimed 
independent contractor; and (7) the degree of independent business organization and 
operation. Id.  
 219. 877 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 72–76. 
 222. Id. at 76; see supra note 218 and accompanying text (providing the list of the 
factors). 
 223. Wang, 877 F.3d at 76. 
 224. Id. at 74–75. 
 225. Id. at 74. 
 226. Id. at 75. 
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however, creates tension for any student who participates in a degree 
program that requires an internship to graduate. 
Consequently, courts should not adopt a uniform test for determining 
employee status under the many federal laws that utilize the same circular 
language to define employee because doing so would likely reduce the 
availability of unpaid internships. If a uniform test indicated that an 
individual was an employee under both Title VII and the FLSA, companies 
would be forced to pay these individuals in order to comply with federal 
law. While it might be strategically beneficial for an unpaid intern to first 
seek employee status under the FLSA because it would help prove 
remuneration, which is required under Title VII’s tests, it will likely still be 
a challenge. Despite using different tests to analyze employee status under 
both Acts, individuals who receive credit with their academic institution 
still struggle to find FLSA protections.  
IV. The Title VII Workaround: Mandatory Arbitration Provisions 
Even if the courts decide in favor of transgender employees or Congress 
legislates unpaid intern protections under Title VII, these protections can be 
easily contracted around via mandatory arbitration provisions. Employees 
around the country increasingly find that employers insert arbitration 
provisions in employment contracts. More than fifty percent of private 
sector employees—more than sixty million American workers—are subject 
to these agreements.227 When employment contracts contain arbitration 
provisions, employees are unable to access state or federal courts to resolve 
many issues that arise out of the employment relationship.228 Employees 
often agree to mandatory arbitration when signing the employment 
agreement, but companies also adopt these practices “by announcing that 
these procedures have been incorporated into the organization’s 
employment policies.”229 Larger companies tend to use mandatory 
arbitration provisions more often than smaller companies, most likely 
because they have better access to “sophisticated human resource policies 
and better legal counsel.”230 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECONOMIC 
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-
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Easily accessible form employment agreements specify that employees 
must arbitrate any wage claim, wrongful termination claim, and “any claim 
based upon any statute, regulation, or law, including those dealing with 
employment discrimination, sexual harassment, civil rights, age, or 
disabilities.”231 This all-encompassing language leaves employees 
vulnerable to abusive behavior without standard legal recourse. Research 
shows that “employees are less likely to win arbitration cases and they 
recover lower damages in mandatory arbitration than in the courts.”232 In 
the Title VII context, employees who agree to these provisions may be 
forfeiting their right to file a discrimination claim in court assuming the 
arbitration provision is upheld.233 
A. The Supreme Court’s Path to Supporting Arbitration Provisions 
During the rise of mandatory arbitration clauses in boilerplate 
employment contracts, courts had to decide how to enforce these provisions 
and what types of claims to exclude from mandatory arbitration clauses. 
Initially, courts held that Title VII protections were beyond the reach of 
compulsory arbitration provisions, finding that employees who agreed to 
these provisions could still file Title VII claims in court.234 However, the 
Supreme Court has since chipped away at Title VII protections, ultimately 
leaving employees subject to mandatory arbitration provisions without 
much recourse in court.235 
  
                                                                                                                 
 231. Form of Simple Employment Contract Containing Arbitration Clause, ARBITRATION 
SERV. OF PORTLAND, http://www.arbserve.com/pdfs/employment_agr2.pdf (last visited Sept. 
20, 2019). 
 232. Colvin, supra note 227. 
 233. It may be possible to challenge these arbitration provisions in court for 
unconscionability or other contractual issues. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 
P.3d 184, 202–03 (Cal. 2013). However, Supreme Court precedent likely prevents states 
from uniformly excluding claims from “mandatory arbitration.” See generally AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (striking down a California rule 
frequently used to find arbitration clauses as unconscionable as a violation of the Federal 
Arbitration Act); see also, e.g., Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, No. 18cv11528 (DLC), 
2019 WL 2610985 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (slip opinion) (finding a New York state law 
that prevented arbitration of sexual harassment claims contravened the intention of the 
Federal Arbitration Act). The focus of Part IV of this Comment is only to explain that 
arbitration provisions can subsume Title VII claims. 
 234. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).  
 235. See generally Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 
(10th Cir. 1994). 
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1. Initial Protections for Title VII Claims 
In 1974, the Supreme Court appeared to favor protecting the statutory 
right to file Title VII claims. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the 
Court evaluated whether an employee (here, a drill operator) could still sue 
his employer under Title VII after entering into a collective-bargaining 
agreement that contained an arbitration provision.236 When the company 
discharged the operator, he “filed a grievance under the collective-
bargaining agreement in force between the company and [his] union.”237 
Although the employee accused the company of firing him for racially 
discriminatory reasons at an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator ultimately 
found that the employer released him for just cause.238 Six months after the 
arbitrator’s final decision, the EEOC also investigated and determined not 
to pursue the claim, issuing the drill operator with a right to sue letter.239  
At this point, the employee brought suit in the appropriate district 
court.240 However, the court granted the company’s motion for summary 
judgment because “the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to 
the arbitrator and resolved adversely to [the employee-operator].”241 The 
Tenth Circuit agreed with this reasoning and affirmed the decision.242 The 
lower “courts evidently thought that this result was dictated by notions of 
election of remedies and waiver and by the federal policy favoring 
arbitration of labor disputes.”243  
The Supreme Court took the opposite stance, ultimately finding that Title 
VII’s policy goal of preventing and remedying discriminatory practices 
would be best served by allowing “an employee to pursue fully both his 
remedy under the . . . arbitration clause” and in the courts.244 The Court 
reached this conclusion for several reasons. First, Congress intended the 
“final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII [to be] vested with federal 
courts.”245 Further, “[t]here [was] no suggestion in the statutory scheme that 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42–44. 
 237. Id. at 39. 
 238. Id. at 42. 
 239. Id. at 43. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. at 45–46 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1975)). 
 244. Id. at 59–60. 
 245. Id. at 44. 
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a prior arbitral decision either foreclose[d] an individual’s right to sue or 
divest[ed] federal courts of jurisdiction.”246  
The Court further surmised that Congress intended Title VII to provide 
procedures to protect an individual and that these same procedures did not 
evaporate upon the adverse conclusion in an arbitration proceeding.247 
Distinguishing between Title VII claims and arbitration proceedings, the 
Court acknowledged that contract rights and statutory rights are distinct and 
that “statutory rights [are] not vitiated merely because both were violated as 
a result of the same factual occurrence.”248 The Court concluded by finding 
that the employee could not have prospectively waived his statutory rights 
under Title VII and that arbitration proceedings are not the best forum to 
adjudicate statutory rights under Title VII.249 The arbitral decision could be 
used as evidence in the judicial system, but the arbitral process was not the 
proper forum to adjudicate Title VII claims.250 At this point, all indications 
suggested that Title VII claims could survive mandatory arbitration 
provisions, serving the employees’ best interests. 
2. A Shift in Theory to Favor Arbitration Provisions 
While Alexander protected statutory claims for almost two decades, the 
Supreme Court has since explicitly upheld the practice of contractually 
removing an employee’s access to the court system.251 In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court evaluated whether a claim under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was subject to a 
mandatory arbitration provision under which the manager-employee 
“agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy.”252 After the 
employer terminated the sixty-two-year-old manager, he filed suit under the 
ADEA.253 Immediately thereafter, the company filed a motion to compel 
arbitration.254 The district court denied the motion, but the Fourth Circuit 
reversed.255 The circuit court noted that nothing in the ADEA’s language 
precluded arbitration and that more recently, the Supreme Court had 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Id. at 47. 
 247. Id. at 49. 
 248. Id. at 50. 
 249. Id. at 51, 56. 
 250. Id. at 60. 
 251. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
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allowed employment arbitration provisions to preclude several statutory 
rights.256  
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the manager argued that the 
compulsory nature of an arbitration provision was “inconsistent with the 
statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA.”257 The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected this assertion, finding that an employer’s ability to 
enforce an arbitration provision does not harm the EEOC or individuals.258  
The manager also challenged the adequacy of arbitration procedures and 
decisions.259 The Court refused to consider the possibility of pro-employer 
bias during arbitration proceedings because rules existed to provide proper 
protections.260 The employee also noted that the limited discovery available 
in arbitration created difficulties in proving discriminatory decisions or 
behavior.261 By acknowledging that the employee “trade[d] the procedures 
and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, 
and expedition of arbitration,” the Court disposed of this concern.262 The 
manager’s final concern was the secretive nature that allowed companies to 
hide discriminatory practices, such as a lack of written opinions.263 The 
Court dispensed of this issue by relying on the fact that such concerns are 
simply part of the arbitration proceedings.264 The Court also noted that, “it 
[was] unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants [would] be subject to 
arbitration agreements.”265 
Relying on Alexander and its progeny, the manager contended that 
previous Supreme Court precedent prevented arbitration from nullifying his 
ADEA action before reaching the courts.266 The Court distinguished its 
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holding in Alexander by noting that the real issue present in Alexander “was 
whether a discharged employee whose grievance had been arbitrated 
pursuant to an arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement was 
precluded from subsequently bringing a Title VII action based upon the 
conduct that was the subject of the grievance.”267 Though the arbitrator’s 
role “is to effectuate the intent of the parties,”268 the Alexander Court 
recognized “the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to 
the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.”269 Notably, 
the Court distinguished cases that protected statutory claims from 
arbitration provisions for two main reasons: 
First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability 
of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they 
involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-
based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of 
statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to 
arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not 
authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases 
understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory 
actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases occurred 
in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the 
claimants there were represented by their unions in the 
arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore was the 
tension between collective representation and individual 
statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present cases.270 
Therefore, the Court prohibited the manager in Gilmer from maintaining his 
ADEA claim in federal court and enforced the arbitration provision that he 
had agreed to when he entered into the employment relationship.271 
Circuit courts have explicitly held that Title VII claims are subject to 
mandatory arbitration agreements.272 Specifically, in Metz v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that a Title VII claim 
was subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions included in a non-
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employment contract.273 The employee, here an account executive, signed a 
“registration contract” pursuant to her job with the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, which required mandatory arbitration between herself 
and Merrill Lynch.274 It was during Merrill Lynch’s appeal process that the 
Supreme Court handed down the Gilmer decision, and Merrill Lynch 
argued that this new precedent changed the analysis.275 In light of the 
Gilmer decision, the Tenth Circuit found that “Title VII claims [were] in 
fact subject to compulsory arbitration.”276 Other circuits have also 
interpreted Gilmer to clearly extinguish a plaintiff’s right to bring a Title 
VII claim when an arbitration provision was in place.277 
3. Arbitration Provisions Serve as a Waiver to Class Actions 
In the modern trend toward expansive arbitration provisions, the 
Supreme Court has also allowed arbitration provisions to serve as a waiver 
of class actions. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, two consumers 
“entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of cellular telephones” 
with the company,278 which included a provision that required the consumer 
to bring his arbitration in an “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or 
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”279 The 
central issue in the case hinged upon the ability of an arbitration provision 
to include a waiver of any class action suits.280 In evaluating such an issue, 
the Court relied on the Federal Arbitration Act, which “was designed to 
promote arbitration.”281 The plaintiff-consumers relied on a California rule 
that did “not require class-wide arbitration, [but] it allow[ed] any party to a 
consumer contract to demand it ex post.”282 The Court acknowledged that 
class arbitration would complicate issues of confidentiality, absentee 
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parties, and selecting a fair and impartial arbitrator.283 Therefore, “the 
switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage 
of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, 
and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”284 The 
Court broadly decided that class arbitration serves as an obstacle to the 
inherent benefits of arbitration, and, therefore, it could not be allowed.285 
Although Concepcion examined arbitration provisions in a consumer 
context, it illustrates the Supreme Court’s strong preference for arbitration 
provisions and the benefits they provide. The Court re-espoused this 
preference for protecting arbitration by ensuring that California’s state 
contract law did not allow class actions to avoid a binding arbitration 
provision.286  
In an attempt to protect employees, district courts, like that of Gomez v. 
MLB Enterprises, Corp., have pushed back on the new Supreme Court 
trend by finding any reason to prevent employment litigation from getting 
lost behind the closed doors of arbitration.287 In this case, waitresses at a 
gentleman’s club “signed arbitration agreements that require[d] them to 
adjudicate employment-related claims against [the] Defendants through 
arbitration.”288 However, since the company had materially breached the 
provisions by “refus[ing] to pay the required arbitration fees,” the court 
refused to enforce the arbitration provision.289 
B. Mandatory Arbitration Provisions Destroy the Purpose of Title VII 
The Supreme Court has effectively provided employers with a 
workaround to Title VII claims. Not only has the Court essentially neutered 
the statute when arbitration provisions are in place, but its rulings favoring 
arbitration provisions perpetuate the culture of sexual harassment that 
#MeToo attempts to address. When employers can settle disagreements 
behind closed doors and force employees to sign non-disclosure 
agreements, victims lose the ability to tell their stories. Meanwhile, 
offending individuals and companies avoid public punishment. When 
victims know that arbitration provisions destroy their Title VII claims, they 
may refuse to come forward.  
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Further, the Supreme Court reasoned that arbitration provisions would 
not become common occurrences when it shifted to allow arbitration 
provisions to cover statutory rights.290 This rationale has turned out to be 
incorrect, as these provisions can be found in nearly every type of form 
contract, including employment agreements. Therefore, the Court’s failure 
to predict the widespread use of mandatory arbitration in the employment 
context should limit Gilmer’s precedential value. 
Substantial changes to employee protections are vital to move forward 
and adequately address the issues discussed in this Comment. At the least, 
sexual harassment and discrimination claims under Title VII should be 
exempt from the ambit of arbitration provisions. Ideally, Title VII claims, 
as a whole, should not be subject to arbitration provisions. Such claims 
should be treated as they were under the Alexander rationale—separate. An 
exemption that prevents employers from contracting around Title VII 
protections would once again protect employees from harassment and 
discrimination and shine a light on the companies that perpetuate 
discriminatory behavior. Without this change, companies will continue to 
hide misconduct and employees will continue to suffer behind closed doors.  
V. Conclusion 
Title VII is not functioning effectively in the modern economy as there 
are clear gaps in protection. If Congress intended Title VII to protect those 
in the workforce broadly, the Act is no longer working as intended. 
Transgender individuals often only succeed in bringing gender non-
conformity claims, while sexual orientation claims face uncertain outcomes. 
Unpaid interns are left vulnerable and without legal recourse. Companies 
contract away an employee’s legal right to bring Title VII claims in the 
courts via arbitration provisions. It is time for Title VII to receive an 
update, either judicially, legislatively, or both. The outdated definition of 
employee and unclear legislative intent behind sex-based discrimination in 
the Act have negatively impacted society for long enough. While states 
should continue to try and protect workers within their borders, it is time 
that Title VII protects #MeToo. 
 
Taylor J. Freeman Peshehonoff 
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